Moraes, Magnitsky and investing in infrastructure
Alexandre de Moraes was sanctioned via the Magnitsky Act. What the hell does that have to do with tech?
Back in May [0], I was wondering what we could do as a country to reduce our structural dependency on US-owned infrastructure. That post was sadly prescient. A couple days after my original post, the ICC's prosecutor was cut-off from his Microsoft email account as a result of US sanctions [1], along with other services from US providers, impacting investigations.
Now that Moraes was sanctioned [2], and with threats of sanctions against other members of STF, we might see BR nationals cut off from US services. Turns out we've done (some of) our homework. While the court relies on Azure for some services, email and documents are handled by national infrastructure [3]. We might still see a large impact on bank accounts and digital services used by the minister, with limited alternatives, but their work probably won't be too disturbed.
My hot take is that this local infrastructure works as leverage in the negotiations table. The brazilian government can't realistically threaten reciprocal tariffs if there is no alternative to US services - can't really make GCP, AWS and Azure 50% more expensive for BR companies with no escape route. The same goes for industrial equipment and almost all technological goods.
As the world potentially fragments into technological blocs, digital sovereignty becomes less of an ideological concept and more of a practical necessity for any nation wanting to maintain autonomy on the world stage.
What areas of our economy are critically dependent on foreign tech, and what's the strategic risk? How much longer can we afford to not invest on them?